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Abstract—  
SigFree  -  online signature-free out-of-the-box 
application-layer method for blocking code-injection 
buffer overflow attack messages targeting at various 
Internet services such as web service. Motivated by the 
observation that buffer overflow attacks typically 
contain executables whereas legitimate client requests 
never contain executables in most Internet services, 
SigFree blocks attacks by detecting the presence of 
code. SigFree is signature free, thus it can block new 
and unknown buffer overflow attacks. SigFree is also 
immunized from most attack-side code obfuscation 
methods. We focus on buffer overflow attacks whose 
payloads contain executable code in machine language, 
and we assume normal requests do not contain 
executable machine code. We shows that the 
dependency-degree-based SigFree could block all types 
of code-injection attack packets tested in our 
experiments with very few false positives.  
Keywords—  Intrusion detection, Buffer overflow 
attacks, code injecting attacks, 
                             I. INTRODUCTION 
        
             The  history  of  cyber  security,  buffer  over-flow  
is  one  of  the  most  serious  vulnerabilities  in computer  
systems.  Buffer overflow vulnerability is a root cause for 
most of the cyber attacks such as server breaking-in, 
worms, zombies, and botnets. A buffer overflow occurs 
during program execution when a fixed-size buffer has had 
too much data copied  into  it. This causes  the  data  to 
overwrite into adjacent memory locations, and depending 
on what is stored there, the behavior of the program itself 
might be affected.  Although  taking a broader viewpoint, 
buffer overflow attacks do not always carry binary code in 
the attacking  requests  (or  packets),code-injection  buffer 
overflow attacks such as stack smashing probably count for 
most of the buffer overflow attacks that have happened in 
the real world. 
 
Although tons of research has been done to tackle buffer 
overflow attacks, existing defenses are still quite limited in 
meeting four highly desired requirements: (R1) simplicity 
in  Maintenance; (R2) transparency  to existing (legacy) 
server OS, application software, and hardware; (R3) 
resiliency to obfuscation; (R4) economical Internet-wide 
deployment. As a result, although several very secure 
solutions have been proposed, they are not pervasively 
deployed, and a considerable number of buffer overflow 
attacks continue to succeed on a daily basis. 
 
To see how existing defenses are limited in meeting 
these four requirements, let us break down the existing 
buffer overflow defenses into six classes, which we will 
review shortly in Section 2: (1A) Finding bugs in source 
code. (1B) Compiler extensions. (1C) OS modifications. 
(1D)Hardware modifications.(1E) Defense-side 
obfuscation (1F) Capturing code running symptoms of 
buffer overflow attacks.We may briefly summarize the 
limitations of these defenses in terms of the four 
requirements as follows: 1) Class 1B, 1C, 1D, and 1E 
defenses may cause substantial changes to existing 
(legacy) server OSes, application software, and hardware, 
thus they are not  used.          
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Fig.  1.  SigFree is  an  application  layer  blocker  between  the  
protected  Server and the corresponding firewall. 
 
To overcome the above limitations, in this paper, we 
propose SigFree, an online buffer overflow attack blocker, to 
protect Internet services. The idea of SigFree is motivated by 
an important observation that “the nature of communication 
to and from network services is predominantly or exclusively 
data and not executable code” [12]. In particular, as 
summarized in [12], 1) on Windows platforms, most web 
servers (port 80) accept data only; remote access services 
(ports 111, 137, 138, 139) accept data only; Microsoft SQL 
Servers (port 1434), which are used to monitor Microsoft 
SQL Databases, accept data only. 2) On Linux platforms, 
most Apache web servers (port 80) accept data only; BIND 
(port 53) accepts data only; SNMP (port 161) accepts data 
only; most Mail Transport (port 25) accepts data only; 
Database servers (Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL) at ports 
1521, 3306, and 5432 accept data only. 
 
Since remote exploits are typically binary executable 
code, this observation indicates that if we can precisely 
distinguish (service requesting) messages containing binary 
code from those containing no binary code, we can protect 
most Internet services (which accept data only) from code-
injection buffer overflow attacks by blocking the messages 
that contain binary code. 
 
Accordingly, SigFree (Fig. 1) works as follows: SigFree is 
an application layer blocker that typically stays between a 
service and the corresponding firewall. When a service 
requesting message arrives at SigFree, SigFree first uses a 
new  OðN  Þ  algorithm, where N  is the byte length of the 
message, to disassemble and distill all possible instruction 
sequences from the message’s payload, where every byte in 
the payload is considered as a possible starting point of the 
code embedded (if any). However, in this phase, some data 
bytes may be mistakenly decoded as instructions. In phase 2, 
SigFree uses a novel technique called code abstraction. Code 
abstraction first uses data flow anomaly to prune useless 
instructions in an instruction sequence, then compares the 
number of useful instructions (Scheme 2) or dependence 
degree  (Scheme 3) to a threshold to determine if this 
instruction sequence (distilled in phase 1) contains code. 
Unlike the existing code detection algorithms [12], [13], [14] 
that are based on signatures, rules, or control flow detection, 
SigFree is generic and hard for exploit code to evade. 
 
We have implemented a SigFree prototype as a proxy to 
protect web servers. Our empirical study shows that there 
exists clean-cut “boundaries” between code-embedded pay-
loads and data payloads when our code-data separation 
criteria are applied. We have identified the “boundaries” (or 
thresholds) and been able to detect/block all 50 attack packets 
generated by frame work700 polymorphic shellcode packets 
generated  by  polymorphic shell-code engines 
Countdown,JumpCallAdditive  CodeRed and a CodeRed 
variation, when they are well mixed with various types of 
data packets. In addition, our experiment results show that 
the extra processing delay caused by SigFree to client 
requests is negligible. 
             The merits of SigFree are summarized as follows: 
they show that  SigFree has taken a main step forward in 
meeting the four requirements aforementioned: 
 
  SigFree is signature free, thus it can block 
new and unknown buffer overflow attacks. 
 
  Without relying on string matching, SigFree 
is  immunized from most attack-side 
obfuscation methods. 
 
  SigFree uses generic code-data separation 
criteria instead of limited rules. This feature 
separates SigFree from [12], an independent 
work that tries to detect code-embedded 
packets. 
 
  Transparency,  SigFree is an out-of-the-box 
solution that requires no server side changes. 
 
  SigFree is an economical deployment with 
very low  maintenance cost, which can be 
well justified by the aforementioned features. 
          SigFree is mainly related to three bodies of work. 
[Category 1] Prevention/detection techniques of buffer 
overflows; [Category 2] worm detection and signature 
generation; [Category 3] machine code analysis for security 
purposes. In the following, we first briefly review Category 1 
and Category 2, which are less close to SigFree. Then, we 
will focus on comparing SigFree with Category 3. 
 
                   II. RELATED WORK 
 
 A.PREVENTION/DETECTION OF BUFFER OVERFLOW 
ATTACKS. 
              Existing prevention/detection techniques of buffer 
over-flows can be roughly broken down into six classes: 
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Class 1A: Finding bugs in source code. Buffer 
overflows are  fundamentally due to programming bugs. 
Accordingly, various bug-finding tools [19], [20] have been 
developed. The bug-finding techniques used in these tools, 
which in general belong to static analysis, include but are not 
limited to model checking and bugs-as-deviant-behavior. 
Class 1A techniques are designed to handle source. SigFree 
handles machine code embedded in a request (message). 
 
Class 1B: Compiler extensions. “If the source code 
is available, a developer can add buffer overflow detection 
automatically to a program by usinga modified compiler” [1]. 
Three such compilers are StackGuard [12], ProPolice [3], and 
Return Address Defender (RAD) [4]. DIRA [5] is another 
compiler that can detecthe malicious input, and repair the 
compromised program. .   
      Class 1C: OS modifications. Modifying some aspects of 
the operating system may prevent buffer overflows such as 
Class 1C techniques need to modify the OS. In contrast, 
SigFree does not need any modification of the OS.   
Class 1D: Hardware modifications. A main idea of hard-
ware modification is to store all return addresses on the 
processor. In this way, no Class 1E: Defense-side 
obfuscation. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
is a main  component of PaX [6]. Address-space 
randomization, in its general form [3], can detect exploitation 
of all memory errors. Instruction set randomization [3], [4] 
can detect all code-injection attacks, whereas SigFree cannot 
guarantee detecting all injected  code. Nevertheless, when 
these approaches detect an attack, the victim process is 
typically terminated. “Repeated attacks will require repeated 
and expensive application restarts, effectively rendering the 
service unavailable” [7].   
Class 1F: Capturing code running symptoms of buffer 
overflow attacks. Fundamentally, buffer overflows are a code 
running symptom. If such unique symptoms can be precisely 
captured, all buffer overflows can be detected. Class 1B, 
Class 1C, and Class 1E techniques can capture some but not 
all  of the running symptoms of buffer overflows. For 
example, accessing nonexecutable stack segments can be 
captured by OS modifications; compiler modifications can 
detect return address rewriting; and process crash is a 
symptom captured by defense-side obfuscation. To achieve 
100 percent coverage in capturing buffer overflow symptoms, 
dynamic data flow/taint analysis/program shepherding 
techniques were proposed in Vigilante [6], TaintCheck [5] 
They can detect buffer overflows during runtime. However, it 
may cause significant runtime overhead (e.g., 1,000 percent). 
To reduce such overhead, another type of Class 1F 
techniques, namely postcrash symptom diagnosis, has been 
developed in Covers [7] and [8]. Postcrash symptom 
diagnosis extracts the “signature” after a buffer overflow 
attack is detected. A more recent system called ARBOR can 
generate vulnerability-oriented signatures by identifying 
characteristic features of attacks and using program context. 
Moreover, ARBOR automatically invokes the recovery 
actions. Class 1F techniques can block both the attack 
requests that contain code and the attack requests that do not 
contain any code, but they need the signatures, 
 Moreover, they either suffer from significant runtime 
overhead or need special auditing or diagnosis facilities, 
which are not commonly available in commercial services. In 
contrast, although SigFree could not block the attack requests 
that do not contain any code, SigFree is signature free and 
does not need any changes to real-world services. We will 
investigate the integration of SigFree with Class 1F 
techniques in our future work. 
 
     
  B.WORM DETECTION AND SIGNATURE GENERATION 
 
Because buffer overflow is a key target of worms 
when they propagate from one host to another, SigFree is 
related to  worm detection. Based on the nature of worm 
infection symptoms, worm detection techniques can be 
broken down into three classes: [Class 2A] techniques use 
such macro symptoms as Internet background radiation 
(observed by network telescopes) to raise early warnings of 
Internet-wide worm infection [3]. [Class 2B] techniques use 
such local traffic symptoms as content invariance, content 
prevalence, and address  dispersion to generate worm 
signatures and/or block worms. Some examples of Class 2B 
techniques are Earlybird [9], Autograph [10], Polygraph [11], 
Hamsa [4], and Packet Vaccine [5]. [Class 2C] techniques 
use worm code running symptoms to detect worms. It is not 
surprising that Class 2C techniques are exactly Class 1F 
techniques. Some examples of Class 2C techniques are 
Shield [36], Vigilante [6], and COVERS [7]. [Class 2D] 
techniques use anomaly detection on packet payload to detect 
worms and generate signature. Wang and Stolfo [7], [8] first 
proposed Class 2D techniques called PAYL. PAYL is first 
trained with normal network flow traffic and then uses some 
byte-level statistical measures to detect exploit code. 
 
Class 2A techniques are not relevant to SigFree. Class 2C 
techniques have already been discussed. Class 2D techni-
ques could be evaded by statistically simulating normal 
traffic [9]. Class 2B techniques rely on signatures, while 
SigFree is signature free. Class 2B techniques focus on 
identifying the unique bytes that a worm packet must carry, 
while SigFree focuses on determining if a packet contains 
code or not. Exploiting the content invariance property, Class 
2B techniques are typically not very resilient to obfuscation. 
In contrast, SigFree is immunized from most attack-side 
obfuscation method  
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PURPOSE 
 
Although source code analysis has been extensively 
studied (see Class 1A), in many real-world scenarios, source 
code is not available and the ability to analyze binaries is 
desired. Machine code analysis has three main security 
purposes: (P1) malware detection, (P2) to analyze obfuscated 
binaries, and (P3) to identify and analyze the code contained 
in buffer overflow attack packets. Along purpose P1,   
proposed static analysis techniques to detect malicious 
patterns in executables, and exploited semantic heuristics to 
detect obfuscated malware. Along purpose P2, used static 
analysis techniques to detect obfuscated calls in binaries, 
Investigated disassembly of obfuscated binaries. 
       SigFree differs from P1 and P2 techniques in design 
goals. The purpose of SigFree is to see if a message contains 
code not, not to determine if a piece of code has malicious 
intent or not. Hence, SigFree is immunized from most attack-
side obfuscation methods. Nevertheless, both the techniques 
in [43] and SigFree disassemble binary code, although their 
disassembly procedures are different. As will be seen, 
disassembly is not the kernel contribution of SigFree.   
 The preprocessor of Snort IDS, identifies exploit code by 
detecting NOP sled. Binary disassembly is also used to find 
the sequence of execution instructions as an evidence of an 
NOP sled . However, some attacks such as worm CodeRed 
do not include NOP sled and, as mentioned in , mere binary 
disassembly is not adequate. 
        Moreover, polymorphic shellcode can bypass the 
detection of NOP instructions by introducing fake NOP zone. 
SigFree does not rely on the detection of NOP sled.   
Finally, being generally a P3 technique, SigFree is most 
relevant to two P3 works innovatively exploited control flow 
structures to detect polymorphic worms. Unlike string-based 
signature match-ing, their techniques identify structural 
similarities between different worm mutations and use these 
similarities to detect more polymorphic worms. The 
implementation of their approach is resilient to a number of 
code transformation techniques. Although their techniques 
also handle binary code, they perform offline analysis. In 
contrast, SigFree is an online attack blocker. As such, their 
techniques and SigFree are complementary to each other with 
different purposes. Moreover, unlike SigFree, their 
techniques [14] may not be suitable to block the code 
contained in every  attack packet, because some buffer 
overflow  code is so simple that very little control flow 
information can be exploited. 
              Independent of our work, proposed a rule-based 
scheme to achieve the same goal as that of SigFree, that is, to 
detect exploit code in network flows. However, there is a 
fundamental difference between SigFree and their scheme 
[12]. Their scheme is rule-based, whereas SigFree is a 
generic  approach that does not require any preknown 
patterns. More specifically, their scheme first tries to find 
certain preknown instructions, instruction patterns, or control 
flow structures in a packet. Then, it uses the found patterns 
and a data flow analysis technique called program slicing to 
analyze the packet’s payload to check if the packet really 
contains code. Four rules (or cases) are discussed in their 
paper: Case 1 not only assumes the occurrence of the call/jmp 
instructions but also expects that the push instruction appears 
before the branch; Case 2 relies on the interrupt instruction; 
Case 3 relies on instruction ret; Case 4 exploits hidden 
branch instructions. Besides, they used a special rule to detect 
polymorphic exploit code that contains a loop. Although they 
mentioned that the above rules are initial sets and may 
require updating over time, it is always possible for attackers 
to bypass those preknown rules. Moreover, more rules mean 
more overhead and longer latency in filtering packet 
 
                     III. SIGFREE OVERVIEW 
     
           A. Basic Definitions and Notations 
                This section provides the definitions that will be 
used in the rest of this paper. 
Definition 1: An instruction sequence is a sequence of CPU 
instructions, which has one and only one entry instruction 
and there exists at least one execution path from the entry 
instruction to any other instruction. 
Definition 2: (instruction flow graph). An  instruction  flow   
 corresponds to a possible transfer of control from instruction 
vi to instruction vj. 
Unlike traditional control flow graph (CFG), a node of an 
IFG corresponds to a single instruction rather than a basic 
block of instructions. To completely model the control flow 
of an instruction sequence, we further extend the above 
definition. 
Definition 3: (extended IFG). An extended IFG (EIFG) is a 
directed graph G ¼ ðV; EÞ, which satisfies the following 
properties: each node v 2 V corresponds to an instruction, to 
affect the decision whether a request contains code or not.  
  This rule can be translated into the following technical 
requirements: if a request contains a fragment of a program, 
the fragment must be one of the remaining instruction 
sequences or a subsequence of a remaining instruction 
sequence, or it differs from a remaining sequence only by 
few instructions. 
               For some instruction sequences, when they are 
executed, whichever execution path is taken, an illegal 
instruction is inevitably reached. We say an instruction is  
inevitably reached if two conditions hold. One is that there 
are no cycles (loops) in the EIFG of the instruction sequence; 
the other is that there are no external address nodes in the 
EIFG of the instruction sequence.     
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Fig. 2. An obfuscation example. Instruction “call eax” is 
substituted by“push J4” and “jmp eax.” 
 
IV.INSTRUCTION SEQUENCES ANALYZER 
 
A distilled instruction sequence may be a sequence of 
random instructions or a fragment of a program in machine 
language. In this section, we propose three schemes to 
differentiate these two cases. Scheme 1 exploits the operating 
system characteristics of a program; Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 
exploit the data flow characteristics of a program. Scheme 1 
is slightly faster than Scheme 2 and Scheme 3, whereas 
Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 are much more robust to 
obfuscation. 
 
Scheme 1 
 
A program in machine language is dedicated to a specific 
operating system; hence, a program has certain character-
istics implying the operating system on which it is running, 
for example calls to operating system or kernel library. A 
random instruction sequence does not carry this kind of 
characteristics. By identifying the call pattern in an instruc-
tion sequence, we can effectively differentiate a real program 
from a random instruction sequence.   
 
 
More specifically, instructions such as “call” and “int 
0x2eh” in Windows and “int 0x80h” in Linux may indicate 
system calls or function calls. However, since the op-codes of 
these call instructions are only 1 byte, even normal requests 
may contain plenty of these byte values. Therefore, using the 
number of these instructions as a criterion will cause a high 
false positive rate. To address this issue, we use a pattern 
composed of several  instructions rather than a single 
instruction. It is observed that before these call instructions 
there are normally one or several instructions used to transfer 
parameters. For example, a “push” instruction is used to 
transfer parameters for a “call” instruction; some instructions 
that set values to registers al, ah, ax, or eax are used to 
transfer parameters for “int” instructions. These call patterns 
are very common in a fragment of a real program. 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 4. SigFree with an SSL proxy. 
 
Note that although Scheme 1 is good at detecting most of 
the known buffer overflow attacks, it is vulnerable to 
obfuscation. One possible obfuscation is that attackers may 
use other instructions to replace the “call” and “push” 
instructions. Fig. 4 shows an example of obfuscation, where 
“call eax” instruction is substituted by “push J4” and “jmp 
eax.” Although we cannot fully solve this problem, by 
recording this kind of instruction replacement patterns, we 
may still be able to detect this type of obfuscation to some 
extent 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Data flow anomaly in execution paths. (a) Define-define 
anomaly.Register eax is defined at I1 and then defined again at I2. (b) 
Undefinereference anomaly. Register ecx is undefined before K1 and 
referenced at K1. (c) Define-undefine anomaly. Register eax is defined at J1 
and then undefined at J2. 
            
                      A distilled instruction sequence maybe a sequence 
of random instructions or a fragment of a program in 
machine language. In this section, we propose three schemes 
to differentiate these two cases. Scheme 1 exploits the 
operating system characteristics of a program; Scheme 2 and 
Scheme 3 exploit the data flow characteristics of a program. 
Scheme 1 slightly faster than Scheme 2 and Scheme 3, 
whereas Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 are much more robust to 
obfuscation. 
 
 Therefore, using the number of these instructions as a 
criterion will cause a high false positive rate. To address this 
issue, we use a pattern composed of several instructions 
rather than a single instruction. It is observed that before 
these call instructions there are normally one or several 
instructions used to transfer parameters. For example, 
a“push” instruction is used to transfer parameters for a “call” 
instruction; some instructions that set values to registers al, 
ah,  ax  or eax are used to transfer parameters.
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real program. Our experiments in show that by selecting the 
appropriate parameters we can rather accurately tell whether 
an instruction sequence is an executable code or not. 
             
          Scheme 1 is fast since it does not need to fully 
disassemble a request. For most instructions, we only need to 
know their types. This saves a lot of time in decoding 
operands of instructions. 
    
 
 
                 
      
Fig. 6. State diagram of a variable. State U: undefined, state D: defined but 
not referenced, state R: defined and referenced, state DD: abnormal state 
define-define, state UR: abnormal state undefine-reference, and state DU: 
abnormal state define-undefine 
 
 
  Scheme 2   
Next, we propose Scheme 2 to detect the aforementioned 
obfuscated buffer overflow attacks. Scheme 2 exploits the 
data flow characteristics of a program. Normally, a random 
instruction sequence is full of data flow anomalies, whereas a 
real program has few or no data flow anomalies. However, 
the number of data flow anomalies cannot be directly used to 
distinguish a program from a random instruction sequence 
because an attacker may easily obfuscate his program by 
introducing enough data flow anomalies.   
In this paper, we use the detection of data flow anomaly in 
a different way called code abstraction. We observe that 
when there are data flow anomalies in an execution path of 
an instruction sequence, some instructions are useless, 
whereas in a real program at least one execution path has a 
certain number of useful instructions. Therefore, if the 
number of useful instructions in an execution path exceeds a 
threshold, we conclude the instruction sequence is a segment 
of a program. 
 
Data flow anomaly. The term data flow anomaly was 
originally used to analyze programs written in higher level 
languages in the software reliability and testing field [8], [9]. 
In this paper, we borrow this term and several other ones to 
analyze instruction sequences.   
.   
A data flow anomaly is caused by an improper sequence 
of actions performed on a variable. There are three data flow 
anomalies:  define-define,  define-undefine, and undefine-
reference  [9].  The define-define anomaly means that a 
variable was defined and is defined again, but it has never 
been referenced between these two actions. The undefine-
reference anomaly indicates that a variable that was 
undefined receives a reference action. The define-undefine 
anomaly means that a variable was defined, and before it is 
used it is undefined. Fig. 5 shows an example.   
Detection of data flow anomalies. There are static [4] or 
dynamic [9] methods to detect data flow anomalies in the 
software reliability and testing field. Static methods are 
not suitable in our case due to its slow speed; dynamic 
methods are not suitable either due to the need for real 
execution of a program with some inputs. As such, we 
propose a new method called code abstraction, which does 
not require real execution of code. As a result of the code 
abstraction of an instruction, a variable could be in one of the 
six possible states. The six possible states are state U: 
undefined; state D: defined but not referenced; state R: 
defined and  referenced; state DD: abnormal state define-
define; state UR: abnormal state undefine-reference; and state 
DU: abnormal state define-undefine. Fig. 6 depicts the state 
diagram of these states. Each edge in this state diagram is  
associated with d,  r, or u, which represents “define,” 
“reference,” and “undefine,” respectively. 
We assume that a variable is in “undefined” state at the 
beginning of an execution path. Now, we start to traverse this 
execution path. If the entry instruction of the execution path 
defines this variable, it will enter the state “defined.” Then, it 
will enter another state according to the next instruction, as 
shown in Fig. 6. Once the variable enters an abnormal state, a 
data flow anomaly is detected. We continue this traversal to 
the end of the execution path. This process enables us to find 
all the data flow anomalies in this execution path. 
Pruning useless instructions. Next, we leverage the 
detected data flow anomalies to remove useless instruc-tions. 
A useless instruction of an execution path is an instruction 
that does not affect the results of the execution path; 
otherwise, it is called useful  instructions. We may find a 
useless instruction from a data flow anomaly. When there is 
an undefine-reference anomaly in an execution path, the 
instruction that causes the “reference” is a useless instruc-
tion. For instance, the instruction K1 in Fig. 5, which causes 
undefine-reference anomaly, is a useless instruction. When 
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instruction that caused the former “define” is also con-sidered 
as a useless instruction. For instance, the instruc-tions I1 and 
J1 in Fig. 5 are useless instructions because they caused the 
former “define” in either the define-define or the define-
undefine anomaly. 
segment of a program. Algorithm 1 shows our algorithm to 
check if the number of useful instructions in an execution 
path exceeds 
a threshold. The algorithm involves a search over an EISG in 
which the nodes are visited in a specific order derived from a 
depth first search. The algorithm assumes that an EISG G and 
the entry instruction of the instruction sequence are given, 
and a push down stack is available for storage. During the 
search process, the visited node (instruction) is abstractly 
executed to update the states of variables, find data flow 
anomaly, and prune useless instructions in an execution path. 
 
Algorithm: check if the number of useful instructions in an 
execution path exceeds a threshold   
Input: entry instruction of an instruction sequence, EISG G 
total =0; useless =0; stack =emptyinitialize the states of all 
variables to “undefined” push the 
entry instruction, states, total, and useless to stack 
While stack is not empty do 
Pop the top item of stack to i, states, total, and useless if total 
₃ useless greater than a threshold then 
Return true   
if i is visited then   
Continue (passes control to the next iteration of the WHILE 
loop)   
          visited total; 
Abstractly execute instruction i  (change the states  of 
variables according to instruction i)   
if there is a define-define or define-undefine anomaly then 
Useless  = useless þ.   
if there is an undefine-reference anomaly then useless 
useless = þ. 
For each instruction j directly following i in the G do push j, 
states, total, and useless to stack   
Return false 
 
    Next, we discuss several special cases in the 
implementation of Scheme 2. 
 The instructions in the IA-32 instruction set can be roughly 
divided into four groups: general purpose instructions, 
floating point unit instruc-tions, extension instructions, and 
system instructions. General purpose instructions perform 
basic data movement, arithmetic, logic, program flow, and 
string operation, which are commonly used by programmers 
to write applications and system software that run on IA-32 
processors [5]. General purpose instructions are also the most 
often used instructions in malicious code. We believe that 
malicious codes must contain a certain number of general 
purpose instructions to achieve the attacking goals. Other 
types of instructions may be leveraged by  an attacker to 
obfuscate his real-purpose code, e.g., used as garbage in 
garbage insertion. As such, we consider other groups of 
instructions as useless instructions. 
 
 Scheme 3 
        We propose Scheme 3 for detecting the aforementioned 
specially crafted code. Scheme 3 also exploits code 
abstraction to prune useless instructions in an instruction 
sequence. 
Unlike Scheme 2, which compares the number of useful 
instructions with a threshold, Scheme 3 first calculates the 
dependence degree of every instruction in the instruction 
sequence. If the dependence degree of any useful instructions 
in an instruction sequence exceeds a threshold, we conclude 
that the instruction sequence is a segment of a program. 
        Dependency is a binary relation over instructions in an 
instruction sequence. We say instruction j depends on 
instruction i if instruction i produces a result directly or 
indirectly used by instruction j. Dependency relation is 
transitive, that is, if i depends on j and j depends on k, then 
i depends on k. For example, instruction 2 directly depends 
on instruction 0 in Fig. 7a and instruction 7 directly depends 
on instruction 2, and by transitive property instruction 7 
depends on instruction 0. We call the number of instructions, 
which an instruction depends on, the dependence 
degree of the instruction. 
To calculate the dependence degree of an instruct 
          For registers, we set their initial states to “undefined” 
at the beginning of an execution path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. (a) A decryption routine that only has seven useful instructions.   
(b) A def-use graph of the decryption routine. 
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                            V.CONCLUSION 
 
We have proposed SigFree, an online signature-free out-of 
box blocker that can filter code-injection buffer overflow 
attack messages, one of the most serious cyber security 
threats. SigFree does not require any signatures, thus it can 
block new unknown attacks. SigFree is immunized from 
most attack-side code obfuscation methods and good for 
economical Internet-wide deployment with little maintenance 
cost. 
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